Based on a formal model of how investments in corporate social responsibility act upon …rm value through goodwill, we derive the hypothesis that under uncertainty bad news are detrimental to goodwill, and subsequently have a negative impact on value. We examine by event study methodology whether bad news in the form of environmental (EV) incidents a¤ect …rm value negatively as measured by abnormal returns using a global data set. An EV incident is a company incident allegedly in violation of international norms on environmental issues. We analyze 142 EV incidents [2003][2004][2005][2006]. The EV incidents are generally associated with loss of value, but which are not statistically signi…cant, except for incidents for …rms in Europe. Furthermore, results indicate that …rms with low goodwill capital (high EV risk rating) are associated with relatively larger negative abnormal returns in case of an EV incident.
Introduction
In this study we assess the e¤ects on …rm value of environmental (EV) incidents among …rms in a global sample during the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . To accomplish this we make use of daily stock market return data from a panel of the largest …rms in the world together with data on EV incidents supplied by GES Investment Services (GES). 1 The main purpose is to shed light on whether the revelation of EV incidents has any e¤ect upon …rm value. In addition, we also investigate the relationship between incident induced e¤ects and EV risk rating (from GES).
Persuant to conventional economic theory, …rms maximize pro…ts subject to technological and other constraints. Without economic incentives like taxes or quantitative regulations, the …rm might, for example, "pollute too much", or behave in some other environmentally or socially detrimental manner. A cursory look around business environments today suggests that this point of view might be a tri ‡e old-fashioned. Indeed, some …rms appear to spend resources to convince potential consumers and other stakeholders that they are more socially and/or environmentally responsible than what the authorities or society demand. If stakeholders care about the social performance of …rms, then incidents such as EV disasters should have a signi…cant impact on the valuation of the …rm. In this paper we sketch a model of a socially responsible …rm that face uncertianty about future EV incidents. Using the concept of goodwill and assuming that "bad" incidents are detrimental to goodwill capital, we are able to form relevant and testable hypotheses.
The empirical framework in this paper is built on the notion that e¢ cient capital markets ensure that stock prices on any day fully re ‡ect all available information about the present value of the cash ‡ows that a …rm is expected to earn in the future (Fama, 1991) . Revelation of new information may cause abnormal changes in stock price if it diverge from expectations. If it can be expected that if a …rm is prone to incidents the stock price will change less in case of an incident. To assess the e¤ect on …rm value of incidents we utilize event study methodology (see e.g. MacKinlay, 1997 ). An attractive feature of event studies is that the direction of causation is quite clear. The release of information or an incident cause stock value to change, and obviously not the other way around. That is; bad/good EV performance potentially induce bad/good …nancial performance. This may seem trivial at …rst, but assumes signi…cance given the fact that other type of studies …nd link between EV performance and …nancial performance, but the direction of causation is unclear (see e.g. Hay et al, 2005) . However, as pointed out by McWilliams et al. (1999) , there are several problems with the event study methodology, especially when applied to corporate social responsibility (CSR) data. They claim that event studies only provide estimates of the shortrun impact on shareholders only. Furthermore, event study …ndings are sensitive to even small changes in research design. In this paper we aim to address the latter by varying the empirical testing methodology.
What can we learn from other event studies on EV performance and …rm value? In a review by Margolis and Walsh (2001) it was found that in a total of 13 event studies related to EV events, 6 showed a positive relationship, 3 a negative relationship, 1 both a positve and a negative relationship, and 3 with no e¤ect at all. Positive relationship means that if the event is good news, then …rm value also change positively. Hamilton (1995) and Khanna et al (1998 Khanna et al ( , 1999 apply event study methodology to the release of information on emissions for the years 1989 -1994 from the Toxic Release Inventory scheme administered by the US Environmental protection agency (EPA). These studies …nd statistically signi…cant abnormal returns around the release date of information on emission levels. P. Portney in Hay et al (2005) concludes that empirical evidence concerning the relationship between EV and …nancial performance is at best ambiguous. In conclusion; from earlier studies we can not have a clear-cut expectation about what this study may reveal. What result to expect, however, should be proceeded by some theoretical argumentation, which is lacking in most empirical applications up to date. The present paper augment to some degree the current literature in three di¤erent aspects: (i) Adequate and empirically testable hypotheses are derived from a formal micro-economic model of the …rm. (ii) The empirical analysis utilize a unique and never used global data-set on EV incidents which enables us to compare between di¤erent regions of the world. The use of a relatively large number of EV incidents spread out over many …rms and regions is also a novel feature of this study. (iii) As mentioned above, McWilliams et al (1999) claim that event studie results are sensitive to variation in methodology, particularly the abnormal return test metric. In response we use several di¤erent test metrics which can be found in the literature (see Patell, 1976, and Boehmer et al, 1991 for discussion about test metrics and their pros and cons). We also attempt to bring order among the di¤erent measures and their inter-relations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Next we present some theoretical underpinnings which help clarify the economic mechnisms behind CSR and why bad news potentially lowers …rm value. The paper proceeds to describe the data used in the empirical analysis. Subsequent sections describe empirical framework and results. Finally, we o¤er a summary and concluding remarks.
Theory
Why would …rm value be a¤ected by environmentally related incidents? How can we model this mechanism at …rm level, and can we draw any useful information from such a model to help us to state relevant hypotheses in the empirical investigation below? This section brie ‡y sketch a model that links CSR and bad news to a …rm's pro…ts and hence the value of the …rm. The theory builds on the green …rm model developed by Kriström and Lundgren (2003) and Lundgren (2003) . The model framework outlined here builds on speci…cally on Lundgren (2007) , which generalize the green …rm model to many types of CSR and introduces explicitly potential costs and bene…ts of CSR. Basically, we augument this model by adding an uncertainty component to account for the arrival of bad news.
Firms balance the costs and bene…ts of CSR on the margin. Costs could be associatied with actual investments, promotion, and crowding out e¤ects, while bene…ts could be a price premium, and possibly lower cost of capital (risk reduction) and/or labor (wage di¤erentials). For a more detailed discussion about how bene…ts and costs are incorporated into the functions of revenues and costs of the …rm, see Lundgren (2007) . In the sequel, we simply assume that pressures and motivations from di¤erent stakeholders will create incentives to engage in projects related to CSR. These e¤orts are summarized in a stock of goodwill capital.
The …rm's management problem is to invest in CSR projects to augment goodwill in an optimal way. Goodwill can also decrease by either deliberate disinvestment in goodwill or by bad publicity, which occur with some degree of randomness. This is introduced formally later. That is, the …rm can opt to augment or reduce a stock of goodwill by investing or disinvesting in CSR. The stock of goodwill acts on pro…ts through both revenues and costs, and therefore, as we shall see, changes in goodwill has direct impact on …rm value.
Let us formally de…ne …rm pro…ts, , at time t as
denoting investment in CSR g (t), 3 and the stock of goodwill G (t). H(t) is a measure of "…nancial health" determined by variables that are not related to CSR, e.g., conventional inputs such as labor and capital, and …nancial variables such as debt to equity ratio. This pro…t function is assumed to be decreasing at an increasing rate in g (t), and increasing at a decreasing rate in G (t). Given the above functional form, the objective or value function for the management problem is (supressing time sub-index hereafter)
where V is the value of the …rm at time t, and e rt is a discount factor where r is the discount rate. H is given at this stage to simplify and focus on the CSR-investment problem. Think of it as a two-stage decision problem; the manager(s) …rst maximize pro…ts with respect to conventional inputs and other variables, then pro…ts are maximized with respect to CSR investments and goodwill capital.
Assume that goodwill capital develop over time as follows,
where is the decay rate of goodwill, and G 0 is a given starting value for goodwill at time t = 0. The management problem is thus to chose g as to maximize the future stream of discounted pro…ts given the equation of motion for goodwill capital.
From the optimality conditions postulated by control theory, we can derive the following relations that must hold (sub-index denotes partial derivatives hereafter):
which simply states that the shadow price of goodwill 4 , denoted , is equal to the marginal cost of investing in CSR, and that the di¤erential equation for the shadow price of goodwill is governed both by the marginal cost of CSR-investment, g = , and marginal bene…ts of the goodwill stock, G .
The system is in steady state when = 0 and G = 0, which, from 4, implies that
That is, in steady state, the marginal cost of investing in one extra unit of CSR is equal to the bene…ts of goodwill it creates discounted by the rate of return plus the rate of depreciation of goodwill. A useful result, especially for the empirical application in this paper, is that the change in the value of the …rm is directly related to the change in goodwill stock. This insight stems from a general result, see e.g. Brock (1998), which says that the time derivative of the value function in an optimal control problem of such type that we skecth here, is directly related to the net changes in all stocks in the model. That is, V = P i i S i , where i is the shadow price of stock i, and S i is the i th stock. Since we only have one stock, goodwill, we can state the following;
This result suggest that changes in goodwill, positive or negative, as a result of investing or disinvesting in CSR, will have direct e¤ect on the value of the …rm. How can we introduce a model feature that mimic bad news arriving over time? It is assumed that bad news harm goodwill, and thus potentially lowers …rm value (depending on market sensitivity to such issues, etc). Here we model this mechanism so that it enters the management problem explicitly via the equation of motion for goodwill, 3. Assume that bad news arrive according to a stochastic process (e.g. Brownian motion or Poisson jump), then we can write the equation of motion for goodwill, 3, as
or equivalently,
dP dt where (G)dP is the random component of goodwill evolution, and the magnitude of the "impact" parameter depend on level of goodwill capital. For example, assume that in each point in time there is a probability of bad news arriving so that the time path of goodwill takes a "dive" according to some pre-speci…ed stochastic process. To solve this stochastic optimal control problem is cumbersome, to say the least. However, we can make a humble conjecture without resorting to stochastic calculus.
5 Given that V = G and 7 we can write
From the relationship depicted above we can see that, all else constant, should the evolution of goodwill take a "dive" because of bad news, dP < 0, promted by e.g. reports of EV disaster, then the value of the …rm also change in the same direction. Now we are equipped to test this theoretical proposition using empirical data on …rm stock returns and reported incidents related to the environment. The relevant hypothesis to test would be if incidents have any e¤ect on goodwill, and as a consequence also on …rm value. Given that bad news or EV incidents are de…ned as dP < 0, and if the shadow price of goodwill, , and the "impact parameter", (G), are both positive, then the value of the …rm should be negatively a¤ected by EV incidents. Note also that the impact parameter potentially depend on G, but whether this e¤ect is increasing, decreasing, or non-existing (with respect to G), is ultimately an empirical question.
Data
In this section we present the data used in the empirical application. The empirical analysis make use of EV incident data, EV risk ratings, and stock and market index returns. We begin by describing the incident data, then proceed to the …nancial data, and …nally a brief description of risk ratings.
Incidents
The incident data were supplied by GES, who describes the data as follows: "Since 2003, GES Alert Service provides clients with weekly news brie…ngs on recently reported company incidents allegedly in violation of international norms on Environmental ... issues. The news are forwarded to the client within a week after obtained through GES' screening. By this systemized process, GES Alert Service singles out news of special investor concern which often take long before being highlighted in mainstream media or disappear in the torrent of news. [...] The GES Alert Service covers major world indexes."
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The data we used contain …rm identi…cation codes and incident reporting dates (to GES clients). The incidents we analyze emanate from [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . The actual incident date may di¤er from reporting date. This means that for a given reporting date, there is some uncertainty about when the incident actually occured. We deal with this by using di¤erent length of the period investigated around the event. More details on window length below. Table 1 shows that the frequency of EV incidents per …rm is highest for sectors Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, and Industrials, known to be environmentally challenging. Table 2 show that one …rm has 11 incidents, but most …rms have only 1 incident during the period studied. According to table 4, the great majority of incidents in our sample happens to US …rms, but according to relative frequency, the UK has most incidents per …rm.
Financial data
Data for calculating daily stock and MSCI World Index and Country US dollar returns, adjusted for dividends net of tax and corporate actions, were retrieved from Thomson Datastream (www.datastream.com), as were sector classi…cations according to Industry Classi…cation Benchmark (ICB) and country classi…cation according to Thomson Datastream.
Risk ratings
GES assigns stocks a speci…c and a general EV risk rating. A …rm's general EV risk rating (A, A-, B+, B, B-, C+, C) is intended to re ‡ect the EV risk of the …rm's industry. The speci…c EV risk rating (a, a-, b+, b, b-, c+, c) indicates the particular EV risk of a given …rm. The ratings are converted from letters to numbers in the subsequent empirical analysis. The speci…c EV risk rating is derived through analysis of the company along more than 60 dimensions based on international standards for EV management and industry-speci…c key indicators for EV performance, among other things. Information sources used in the analysis process include o¢ cial company documents, dialogue with companies, non-governmental organizations, the media and GES partners in the Sustainable Investment Research International Group (www.ges-invest.com and private communication with GES representatives).
Empirical framework
The e¤ects of the incidents on …rm value are analyzed as follows. 7 (i) During an estimation period prior to an incident, we estimate normal return with the market model. (ii) In an event window, separated from and subsequent to the estimation period, we estimate abnormal returns surrounding an incident. (iii) The abnormal returns are calculated for each period in the event window, i.e., the actual return minus normal return.(iv) Cumulative abnormal returns for each event and event window are calculated, and these are then averaged across events. (v) Test if cumulative abnormal returns are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Let us formalize this procedure. The market model (see e.g. Sharpe, 1964 ) is used to estimate normal returns in the estimation period prior to each incident; 8 r i = i + i r m + i ; i = 1:::N; incidents, (9) = 1:::T; days in estimation period, where in this case N = 142, and T = 88 (about four months). OLS regressions are performed using realizations of r i and r m to obtain estimates of i and i (the residual is assumed to have white noise properties). The estimate of the variance of the observed residuals is given by,
The estimated market model is used to predict returns in the event window. The prediction errors are abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are de…ned as,
where t 0 is the event day, and t b (begin day) and t e (end day) de…nes the event window lenght, L. If OLS assumptions hold also in the event window, then the expected abnormal return is zero, and there is no serial correlation or covariance with market returns. That is,
(12) t = t b :::t 0 :::t e ; and i = 1:::N:
Further, we also make the following assumption,
This means no cross-sectional dependence of abnormal returns in event window. 9 The function C it (see Patell, 1976) corrects event window variance to account for possible increase in variation outside the estimation period,
Using 10, 11, and 14 we can de…ne the standardized abnormal return as,
which is approximately unit normal. De…ne the normalized sum (over L) of cumulative standardized abnormal returns of event i as,
The main reason for using standardized abnormal returns is that it prevents securities with large variances from dominating the test. 10 The multiplication of the denominator by p L scales the daily standard deviation to a L-day standard deviation corresponding to the event window length. Finally, form the normalized sum (over N ) to obtain the following test statistic,
T 1 is a t-statistic, used in e.g. Patell (1976) , which can be used to test whether incidents have any signi…cant e¤ect on returns during the speci…ed event window. A risk when forming P N i=1 scar iL is that possible event induced variance is ignored. Boehmer et al (1991) suggests an augmented test statistic which they call the standardized cross-sectional method.
11 This test statistic is found by dividing the T 1 -test statistic by a cross-sectional standard error,
The appropriate t-distributed test statistic is then,
That is, if N = 1 then T 1 and T 2 are equal. A third, more simple, test statistic can be derived from unstandarized abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns in an event window is,
so that average cumulative abnormal returns over all events can be written,
A (simple) t-distributed test statistic of abnormal returns is then speci…ed as,
where the denominator is the square root of the variance of acar N L . Note that this test will not be sensitive to changes in variance due to out-of-estimationperiod forecasting or event induced variance.
The tests T 0 , T 1 , and T 2 are performed on abnormal returns to investigate the following hypotheses,
Connecting to the theory section, recall equation 8, this means we want to test whether the shadow price of goodwill, , and the impact parameter, (G), are jointly positive. The tests are performed for three di¤erent windows: +/-20, +/-7, and +/-3 days surrounding the event day. The motivation for this is to account for uncertainty about the actual incident date.
In addition, we investigate the relation between abnormal returns and …rm characteristics by …tting a linear cross-sectional regression model. Specifically, variations of the following equation is estimated,
where x i and EVRR i are vectors of …rm characteristics and EV risk ratings respectively, and a and are the associated parameter vectors. Environmental risk ranking has two dimensions, …rm speci…c and industry speci…c. As …rm characteristics we use sector dummys. The purpose of this excercise is to test whether a proxy for goodwill capital (the EV risk ratings) have any e¤ect -positive, negative or non at all -on the magnitude of abnormal returns; i.e., in equation 8, we want to test if @ (G)=@G S 0.
Next we proceed to present results from the event study and cross-sectional regressions.
Results
There are 74 …rms with incidents in the sample and all of them have at least one incident. Prior to the start of each incident window, 88 days, market model estimates are generated for the …rms having incidents as well as for all other …rms in the data universe (see table 5 below). According to table 5 there are no signi…cant di¤erences between incident …rms and other …rms in the estimation periods (88 days prior to incidents). Furthermore, the alpha and beta values are -in both cases -not out of expectation (around zero and unity, respectively).
In table 6-9 below we present results for the tests T 0 , T 1 and T 2 , for three di¤erent event windows sizes. Abnormal returns and the impact of EV incidents are tested for four di¤erent geographical areas; global, US, non-US, and Europe (Europenan countries with EV incidents are found within the EURO zone, Denmark, UK, and Switzerland). Table 6 shows that when using all the data we have, abnormal returns are negative in all three windows, but only near statistical signi…cance (a t-score of -1.650 is just inside the 10% level) when applying the simplest test, T 0 , on the +/-20 day window. Table 7 presents test results for the US only. Abnormal returns are negative in the two larger window, but positive in the +/-3 day window. Non of test statistics are anywhere close to being statistically signi…cant. In table 8 results for all geographical areas except US are entered. Abnormal returns are negative in all three event windows. For the +/-20 window, T 0 and T 1 are statistically signi…cant on the 10% level. However, the more sophisticated test, T 2 , is not signi…cant at any defendable signi…cance level.
Tables 6, 7 and 8 suggests that US …rm returns are not sensitive to EV incidents. Outside US there seems to be some degree of sensitivity of returns with respect to incidents according to test statistics T 0 and T 1 in the +/-20 window. Test statistics for Europe are found in table 9. Abnormal returns are negative and notably higher in magnitude compared to abnormal returns in other geographical areas (tables 6-8). Furthermore, in Europe we see that all three tests are statistically signi…cant at 5% level for the largest event window. Shrinking the window down to +/-7 days shows that the signi…cance of the tests also shrink, with only the simple T 0 -test being signi…cant on the 10% level. The European area results supports our theoretical model's prediction of a positive price for goodwill and a positive impact parameter; i.e., incidents cause goodwill to decrease and, as a consequence, …rm value also decrease.
Finally, we use the regression model speci…ed in equation 21 to analyze if the magnitude of abnormal returns are correlated to a proxy for goodwill capital, the EV risk ratings, for companies in Europe (where the abnormal returns were found statistically signi…cant). Several variants of the regression model were estimated; with and without sector dummys, and also elaborating with di¤erent combinations of …rm speci…c and sector speci…c EV risk. There were problems, however, with multicollinearity when including both sector dummys and industry or sector speci…c EV risk, and therefore we do not present results from those regressions. Table 10 summarize the results from running two regressions: Model 1) a constant and …rm speci…c and sector speci…c EV risk as separate independent variables; Model 2) a constant and an aggregate measure of sector and …rm speci…c risk. The results in table 10 show that the model using the aggregate measure (model 2) has slightly superior explanatory power. From model 1 we see that …rm speci…c risk is statistically signi…cant on 10% level in model 1, while sector speci…c risk is signi…cant on 5% level. The negative slope parameter estimates in both models imply larger abnormal losses for relatively risky …rms in risky sectors.
Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper we examine by event study methodology if environmental (EV) incidents a¤ect …rm value negatively as measured by abnormal returns. The analysis use a global database on incidents not used in research before from GES Investment Services, which monitors some thousand stocks in the major world indexes for incidents. We analyze all (142) EV incidents in the database which covers the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . The main …ndings are that the incidents are generally associated with negative returns, but which are not statistically signi…cant, except for for …rms in Europe. There is also evidence pointing to US …rm values being unsensitive to EV incidents, implying that …rm stakeholders have di¤erent views on EV incidents in Europe and the US. The results are robust with respect to a number of variations in test methodology. Furthermore, we …nd evidence that EV risk (our goodwill proxy) have a negative and signi…cant statistical e¤ect upon the magnitude of abnormal returns in Europe, implying that higher EV risk (low goodwill) is associated with a more extensive loss of …rm value compared to …rms with low EV risk (high goodwill). A reasonable explanation for this is that …rms with high risk are also subjected to more severe EV incidents, causing more economic and reputational damage.
The …ndings in this paper suggests that a …rm's voluntary e¤ort to avoid EV incidents may be more pronounced in Europe than in the US, since "punishment" from stakeholders is more likely (here in the form of loss in …rm value). This means that policy directed towards designing public disclosure programs of EV performance 12 , which increase transparency with respect to EV issues, have the potential to be successful when it comes to motivating …rms to voluntary internalize externalities from production.
13 Furthermore, Rauscher (2006) , in a study of voluntary emisson reductions, suggest that if there exist social reward (punishment) for corporate social responsibiliy (CSR) (irresponsibility), then traditional EV policy, e.g. taxes, may hamper the private provision of CSR. That is, social rewards may be crowded out by EV regulation in the shape of a tax or regulation.
Without doubt there are numerous problems with the event study methodology and the incident data at hand. The actual date of the incident is not known and we have not controlled for other events in the event window that might a¤ect returns. The analytical framework also lack mechanisms accounting for expectations. Future studies could explore the possibilies of applying alternative methods to analyze the e¤ects of EV incidents. This would complement the present event study and potentially shed some additional light on the issue of EV incidents and impact on …rm valuation.
